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I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Leaf Tobacco Exporters Association, Inc. v. Block:
The Role of the Zone of Interests Standing Test in Denial
of Standing to Challenge Agency Action
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the
federal courts solely to cases and controversies.' A case or controversy arises
when a claimant has asserted a sufficiently personal interest in the result of
a claim to guarantee that the claim is concrete and adverse. 2 To have standing
to sue in federal court, claimants must satisfy not only the basic article III
case or controversy requirement,3 but also various prudential standing tests.
4
1. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (power of federal judiciary encompasses cases and
controversies in law or equity arising under Constitution, United States laws, and treaties).
Article III of the United States Constitution establishes the judiciary as the third branch of
government. Id. § 1; see also id. art. I (investing legislative power in Congress); id. art. II
(investing Executive power in President). Article III vests the judicial power in the United States
Supreme Court and those inferior courts that Congress sees fit to establish. Id. art. III, § 1.
2. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (claimant must allege personal stake in
action to demonstrate existence of concrete case or controversy). The article III concept of case
or controversy comprises the specific elements of the justiciability doctrine. See generally L.
Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy"
Requirement, 93 HAXv. L. REV. 297, 298-99 (1979). For a case to be justiciable, that case must
meet the requirements of mootness, ripeness, and standing. Id. A case is moot, and therefore
is not justiciable, when a court's decision would not resolve the facts of the particular case. See
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937) (case is moot when court's order
will not operate on any subject matter). For example, cases may become moot when the issue
involves a statute governing rights of infants, and the complainant exceeds the age of infancy
before the court rules on the merits. See Atherton Mills v. Johnston, 259 U.S. 13, 15 (1922).
(Claim brought under infancy statute is moot when claimant is no longer an infant). A case is
unripe and, thus, not justiciable under article III if the case turns on a hypothetical threat of
injury that has not yet materialized as a specific injury. See United Pub. Workers of Am. v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-91 (1947) (hypothetical threat does not satisfy Article III case or
controversy requirement). See generally NowAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 72
(2d ed. 1983) (discussing ripeness doctrine) [hereinafter cited as NowAK]. In addition, for a case
to be justiciable, the claimant must have standing to sue on the claim brought. See NOWAK,
supra, at 77 (discussing various standing tests); see also infra notes 4-6 and accompanying text
(discussing standing generally under article III); infra notes 6-10 and accompanying text
(discussing zone of interests standing test).
3. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968). In Flast v. Cohen, the United States
Supreme Court described the basis of article III standing inquiry as whether the claim for which
a claimant seeks adjudication alleges concrete harm sufficient to create the adversary nature
traditionally considered necessary to make a claim judicially resolvable. Id.; see also supra notes
1-2 (discussing article III case or controversy requirement).
4. See Note, A Defense of the "Zone of Interests" Standing Test, 1983 DUKE L.J. 447,
448 (1983) (discussing prudential standing tests). Prudential standing tests embody the divergent
policy considerations inherent in different types of court claims, thus there are different kinds
of standing tests. See id. at 447-48. One example of a standing test is the nexus test for taxpayer
standing. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 102 (applying nexus test to question of taxpayer's standing).
The prudential nexus standing test requires a claimant to allege that a nexus exists between the
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Prudential standing tests are judge made rules created to prevent abuse of
the judicial process and to preserve separation of powers.5
In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,
6
the United States Supreme Court created the zone of interests standing test,
designed to govern courts' prudential considerations of the standing of parties
who claim injury through governmental agency action in violation of a
federal statute.' Claimants charging illegal agency action may satisfy the
article III case or controversy standing inquiry by alleging injury-in-fact.
8
Allegation of injury-in-fact establishes the concrete adversity necessary to an
article III case or controversy. 9 In addition, claimants charging illegal agency
action must satisfy the prudential element of standing. 0 To satisfy the
prudential element of standing, a claimant's allegedly injured interest must
have been arguably within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the
federal statute under which the claimant brought suit." An important issue
arising from the use of the zone of interests test is whether a claimant who
satisfies the constitutional standing requirements by sustaining injury-in-fact
may lack standing to litigate the claim for failure to satisfy the prudential
zone of interests test.' 2 In Leaf Tobacco Exporters Association, Inc. v.
claimant's status as a taxpayer and the constitutional violation that the claimant alleged has
occurred. Id. In addition, taxpayers must satisfy the constitutional element of standing by
alleging injury-in-fact. Id. at 103. Another prudential standing test is the zone of interests test.
See infra notes 6-10 and accompanying text (discussing use of zone of interests test in cases
involving standing to challenge agency action). See generally Note, supra, at 447-48 (discussing
zone of interests prudential standing test).
5. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 96-97 (standing requirements properly limit federal courts to
role consistent with separation of powers); Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III:
Perspectives on the "Case of Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REv. 297, 300 (1979)
(standing requirements prevent abuse of judicial process by requiring courts to decide only real
cases). Standing requirements prevent or reduce abuse of judicial process by requiring courts to
refuse to adjudicate abstract legal issues if claimants do not present the issues in an actual
controversy involving injury. Flast, 392 U.S. at 96-97. Separation of powers is an important
policy goal because maintaining separation of powers limits the activities of each of the three
branches of government to activities consistent with each branches' constitutional purpose. See
NowAK, supra note 2, at 136-37. Some duplication of activities is judically acceptable. See
Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (complete separation of powers
is archaic). Nevertheless, courts generally follow a well established policy in favor of judicial
self-restraint in order to avoid unwarranted judicial oversight of legislative branch decisions.
See Brilmayer, supra, at 302 (courts frequently cite judicial self-restraint principle in declining
to address merits of claims for lack of standing).
6. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
7. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53
(1970) (discussion of zone of interests standing test); infra notes 11-12 and accompanying text
(discussing components of zone of interest test); see also infra notes 65-72 and accompanying
text (discussing Data Processing).
8. See Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152 (claimant who alleges economic injury-in-fact
resulting from challenged agency action satisfies article III case or controversy requirement).
9. Id.
10. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing prudential standing tests).
11. See Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153 (to satisfy zone of interests test, claimant must
demonstrate that statute protected or regulated claimant's interests).
12. See Leaf Tobacco Exporters Ass'n., Inc. v. Block, 749 F.2d 1106, 1116 (4th Cir.
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Block, " the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied
the zone of interests test to determine whether the Association of Tobacco
Exporters (the Exporters) had standing to challenge the United States Sec-
retary of Agriculture's decision to permit a tobacco growers cooperative to
enter the tobacco exporting market.
4
In Leaf Tobacco, the Exporters sought to challenge the United States
Department of Agriculture's (USDA) decision to change the USDA's policy
of prohibiting a tobacco growers cooperative, which participated in a USDA
price support program, from marketing the grower's tobacco crop directly
to foreign buyers. 5 The USDA establishes an annual support price for flue-
cured tobacco. 6 The annual support price enables growers who are unable
to sell tobacco at a price higher than the support price to sell the tobacco at
the support price to the Flue Cured Tobacco Stabilization Corporation (the
Cooperative). 7 The Cooperative purchases and processes the tobacco with
1984). In Leaf Tobacco Exporters Assoc. Inc. v. Block, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit denied standing to claimants who had properly demonstrated injury-in-fact,
the first part of the standing test. Id. at 1108; see infra notes 15-61 and accompanying text
(discussing facts and reasoning in Leaf Tobacco). The Fourth Circuit in Leaf Tobacco noted
that denial of standing to a claimant who has suffered concrete injury may seem unjust. Leaf
Tobacco, 749 F.2d at 1116. The appearance of unfairness stems from the fact that denial of
standing necessarily precludes injured claimants from obtaining any judicial relief. See infra
notes 33-40 and accompanying text (discussing policy considerations supporting validity of zone
of interests test). The Leaf Tobacco court, however, concluded that threats of unjustified
judicial interference outweigh the possible risk that the failure to grant standing may preclude
any possibility of judicial review. Leaf Tobacco, 749 F.2d at 1112-13; see also Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974) (Courts cannot grant standing to
plaintiff merely due to lack of other available plaintiffs).
13. 749 F.2d 1106 (4th Cir. 1984).
14. Id. at 1108. Plaintiffs in Leaf Tobacco comprised an association of commodity
brokers engaged in the selling of tobacco to buyers who included foreign purchasers. Id. The
Association of Tobacco Exporters (Exporters) consisted of 47 member companies of commodity
brokers. Id.
15. Id. at 1108; see infra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing purpose and
framework of tobacco support price system).
16. See 749 F.2d at 1108. The Fourth Circuit in Leaf Tobacco noted that the 1949
Agriculture Act (1949 Act) price support system created price support systems for various farm
products. See 1949 Agriculture Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (1982) (creating price support system
for various farm products). Section 1421(d) of the 1949 Act provides that agencies should
determine support prices based upon the parity price of products on a seasonal basis. 7 U.S.C.
§ 1421(d) (1982). In arriving at a support price, the Secretary of Agriculture must consider such
factors as supply and demand of the specific product, availability of funds, perishability of the
commodity, and the product's importance to the national agricultural economy. 7 U.S.C. §
1421(b) (1982). The 1949 Act's support price scheme also governs products other than tobacco,
such as feed grains, corn and sorghum. 7 U.S.C. § 1421(b) (1982).
17. See 749 F.2d at 1108-09 (growers may sell tobacco to Cooperative at support price
when growers are unable to sell tobacco for higher price). Congress established the Cooperative
price support program to stabilize farmers' incomes. See S. REP. No. 1022, 80th Cong. 2d Sess.
1, 3 (1948) reprinted in 1948 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 2138, 2141 (CCC Act's purpose is
to stabilize farm economy and support farm income); see infra notes 82-85 and accompanying
text (discussing CCC Act's legislative history); infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text
(discussing framework of CCC-Cooperative arrangement).
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funds borrowed from the Commodity Credit Corporation (the CCC). 8 The
CCC is an agency of the USDA.' 9 The CCC retains veto power over sales
that the Cooperative makes, to protect the CCC's investment. 20 Until 1982,
the CCC pursued an unwritten policy of prohibiting the Cooperative from
selling Cooperative tobacco directly to foreign buyers2' because the CCC
feared that the Cooperative's lack of expertise in foreign markets would
result in increased Cooperative deficits to the CCC.22 In 1982, however, the
CCC abandoned the CCC's prohibition on the Cooperative's participation
in foreign trade in hopes that the Cooperative's participation in the foreign
tobacco market would yield sufficient profits to decrease the Cooperative's
indebtedness to the CCC.
21
The Exporters objected to the CCC's discontinuance of the policy
prohibiting the Cooperative from selling directly to foreign buyers. 24 The
18. See CCC Charter Act (CCC Act), 15 U.S.C. § 714 (1982). The CCC is an agency of
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Id. The CCC's purpose is to stabilize,
support, and protect farm income through the implementation of price support programs. Id.
In addition, the CCC helps to maintain acceptable supply levels of agricultural commodities.
Id. Moreover, the CCC Act charges the CCC with aiding in the orderly distribution of
agricultural products. Id.; see also Leaf Tobacco, 749 F.2d at 1108-09 (discussion of purpose
and operation of CCC in Leaf Tobacco).
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 714 (1982) (CCC is a United States Government agency under control
of USDA).
20. See 749 F.2d at 1109. The Leaf Tobacco court noted that the CCC protected the
CCC's investment in the Cooperative by retaining the right to prohibit the Cooperative from
entering into any contracts that the CCC believed would be financially unsound. Id.; see also
7 C.F.R. § 1464.2(b)(iii) (1985) (CCC has veto power over proposed Cooperative sales).
21. See 749 F.2d at 1109. (CCC until 1982 prohibited Cooperative from selling directly
to foreign buyers). The Leaf Tobacco court noted that the CCC prohibition regarding foreign
sales was merely an unwritten CCC policy, used in approving or disapproving Cooperative sales
contracts. Id. The CCC based the unwritten policy on the conclusion that the Cooperative
lacked expertise in dealing with foreign buyers and that this lack of expertise would result in a
loss of money to the Cooperative. Id.
22. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing CCC purpose for prohibiting
Cooperative from selling directly to foreign buyers).
23. See 749 F.2d at 1109. The Fourth Circuit in Leaf Tobacco, noted that on November
30, 1981 the USDA issued a press release describing the new policy of allowing the Cooperative
to sell tobacco in foreign markets. Id. The new policy took effect in 1982. Id. The USDA
described the new policy as a companion to the No Net Cost Tobacco Program Act of 1982.
Id.; see No Net Cost Tobacco Program Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1445 (1982). The No Net Cost Program
provided that the Cooperative contribute the Cooperative's profits into a fund designed to cover
any Cooperative debts to the CCC occurring in years in which the Cooperative was unable to
repay the CCC loans. 7 U.S.C. § 1445.1 (1982). The USDA hoped that the new policy of
permitting the Cooperative to sell to foreign buyers would decrease the Cooperative's indebt-
edness to the CCC. Leaf Tobacco, 749 F.2d at 1109.
24. See 749 F.2d at 1110. The Exporters claimed that the Exporters took part in the
foreign tobacco purchaser's market. Id. Furthermore, the Exporters claimed that the Exporters'
based planned investments in the export market on the previous USDA policy of prohibiting
tobacco growers from entering the export market directly. Id. The Exporters claimed that new
competition from the Cooperative was unfair because the Cooperative obtained funds from the
CCC at low Government rates. Id. The CCC based the interest rate on CCC loans on the
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Exporters asserted that the Secretary of Agriculture had violated section 553
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by neglecting to notify interested
parties of the proposed change in policy.25 Furthermore, the Exporters argued
that the CCC Charter Act 26 (the CCC Act) and the Agricultural Act of 194927
(the 1949 Act) protected the Exporters' interests. The CCC Act and the 1949
Act govern the federal government's tobacco policies. 28 The Exporters claimed
that the USDA's 1982 policy change injured interests of the Exporters that
the CCC Act and the 1949 Act protect. 29 The Exporters presented these
claims to the USDA and then filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina.30 The district court dismissed the
Cooperative on Treasury Department monthly determinations of cost of money to the Treasury.
Id. Treasury Department interests rates vary from the standard prime lending rate. See Wall
St. Journal, Nov. 19, 1985 at 48 col. I (listing interest rates).For example, on November 19,
1985, the Treasury Department rate was 7.26%, while the prime rate was 9.5%, a difference of
224 basis points. Id.
25. See 749 F.2d at I 110. In Leaf Tobacco, the Exporters claimed that the USDA violated
§ 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by failing to give prior notice to interested
parties like the Exporters of the proposed policy change allowing the Cooperative to sell to
foreign buyers. Id; see Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (agencies contemplating
informal or formal rulemaking must give notice and opportunity to comment to interested
parties). Section 553 of the APA requires notice to interested parties through publication in the
Federal Register when agencies contemplate legislative formal or informal rulemaking. 5 U.S.C.
§ 553 (1982). Section 553(b)(B),however, does not require notice and comment when the rule is
interpretive, rather than legislative in nature. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (1982); see PIERCE, SHAPIRo,
& VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS (1985) [hereinafter cited as PIERCE] § 6.4.4a
(APA does not require notice and comment for interpretive rules). Generally, a rule is legislative
if the rule creates legally enforceable duties that did not exist prior to the rule. PIERCE, supra,
at § 6.4.4a. A rule is interpretive if the rule intends to clarify the substance and character of
an already existing statute or legislative rule. PIERCE, supra, at § 6.4.4a. Adjudication of the
merits of the Exporters' claims in Leaf Tobacco, therefore, would probably turn on whether
the Fourth Circuit held the USDA's policy change to be an interpretive rule. See supra notes
22-23 and accompanying text (discussing USDA's policy change).
26. See 15 U.S.C. § 714(a)-(p) (1982) (establishing CCC for purpose of stabilizing,
supporting and protecting farm income and prices). See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying
text (discussing legislative history of CCC Act).
27. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1432 (1982) (requiring Secretary of Agriculture to provide price
supports through CCC).
28. See supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text (discussing purpose and provisions of
CCC Act and 1949 Act).
29. See 749 F.2d at 1110. In Leaf Tobacco, the Exporters claimed that the CCC Act and
the 1949 Act required the Secretary of Agriculture to consider the Exporters' interests when
making decisions such as the 1982 policy change, which allowed growers to sell to foreign
buyers. Id. The Exporters asserted that the Secretary's failure to consider the Exporters' interests
constituted an arbitrary and capricious decision, and an abuse of discretion. Id.
30. Id. Generally, claimants must exhaust administrative remedies before courts will accept
jurisdiction to review agency action. See PIERCE, supra note 25, at § 5.7.3 (discussing exhaustion
doctrine); see also Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938) (district
courts have no power to issue injunctions when plaintiff has not exhausted all administrative
remedies). The USDA regulations regarding rulemaking procedures require interested parties
who seek to challenge USDA rules to file a petition with the official who promulgated the rule.
7 C.F.R. Subtitle A § 1.28 (1985). Since the Leaf Tobacco court held that the Exporters lacked
1986]
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Exporters' suit on the ground that the Exporters lacked standing to challenge
the administrative action that the USDA performed through the CCC.3' On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld
the district court's dismissal on the ground that the Exporters failed to
satisfy the prudential standing considerations of the zone of interests standing
test.
32
In Leaf Tobacco, the Fourth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court
frequently had cited and applied the zone of interests test in cases concerning
standing to challenge agency action.33 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, stated
that the Exporters must satisfy the zone of interests test to have standing to
challenge the USDA's actions. 34 The Leaf Tobacco court observed that the
standing, the court never considered the merits of the Exporters' claim that the USDA's policy
change constituted a rulemaking. See 749 F.2d at 1110 (refusing to consider merits because
Exporters lack standing to challenge USDA's action); infra notes 64-92 and accompanying text
(discussing support for Leaf Tobacco holding that Exporters have no standing to challenge
USDA's action). The Leaf Tobacco court, therefore, did not consider whether the USDA policy
change constituted a rulemaking. See supra note 25 (discussing merits of Exporters' claims).
Since the Leaf Tobacco court never ruled on whether the USDA's action was a rulemaking, the
court did not have to determine whether the Exporters had exhausted the Exporters' adminis-
trative remedies. See 7 C.F.R. Subtitle A § 1.28 (1985) (requiring interested parties to file
petition challenging agency rule with official who issued rule).
31. 749 F.2d at 1108. The Fourth Circuit in Leaf Tobacco cited the unpublished opinion
of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, which dismissed
the Exporters' claims for lack of standing. Id.
32. Id. at 1110. The Leaf Tobacco court dismissed the Exporters' claim for lack of
standing. Id. The Leaf Tobacco court held that the Exporters lacked standing because the
Exporters failed to satisfy the prudential considerations of the zone of interests test. Id. The
court held that the Exporters failed the zone of interests test because the Exporters had not
adequately proven that the Exporters' interest in avoiding increased competition from the
Cooperative arguably was within the zone of interests that Congress intended to protect under
the CCC Act or the 1949 Act. 749 F.2d at I110; see 15 U.S.C. § 714(a)-(p) (1982) (CCC Act)
(CCC Act protects interests of farmers); 7 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1432 (1982) (1949 Act) (1949 Act
protects interests of farmers); see also infra notes 81-91 and accompanying text (discussing
legislative intent of CCC Act and 1949 Act).
33. 749 F.2d at 1111; see infra notes 64-80 and accompanying text (comparing Leaf
Tobacco with Data Processing).
34. See 749 F.2d at 1110. Although the Fourth Circuit held the zone of interests test
applicable in Leaf Tobacco, the court noted that the test has been the subject of academic
controversy. Id. The Leaf Tobacco court cited articles and treatises of three of the zone of in-
terests test's critics as evidence of academic controversy. Id. The opinion of one commentator,
Davis, is that courts should discard the zone of interests test as a prerequisite for standing; see
4 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 24:17 (2d ed. 1982 [hereinafter cited as DAvis].
Davis argues that the element of injury-in-fact should be the only test for standing because injury-
in-fact satisfies the Article III standing requirement. DAVIS, supra, § 24.17. Another commen-
tator, Marquis, argues that the substance of a zone of interests standing inquiry goes to issues
usually resolved in a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, for failure to state a claim upon which a court can grant relief. Marquis, The Zone of
Interests Component of the Federal Standing Rules: Alive and Well After All?, 4 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L.J. 261, 285 (1981); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (party may move to dismiss for
failure to state claim upon which court can grant relief). Marquis, therefore, believes that courts
should address threshhold questions such as standing an reviewability together with the question
[Vol. 43:431
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
zone of interests test preserves the separation of powers by requiring the
judiciary to refrain from adjudicating political claims which are better suited
to legislative resolution. 5 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit in Leaf Tobacco
reasoned that the zone of interests test is important because the test reserves
the right to challenge, and thus to shape, statutory schemes of benefits to
those parties whom Congress intended to be the statutes' beneficiaries.3 6 The
Fourth Circuit reasoned that the zone of interests test limits standing to
individuals that Congress intended to protect under a specific statute and,
therefore, reserves the benefits provided under the statute to Congress'
intended beneficiaries.17 The Leaf Tobacco court observed that participation
in shaping a statutory program, through litigating statutory challenges, is a
valuable benefit inherent in any statute. 8 The Leaf Tobacco court recognized
that the zone of interests test served initially as part of a trend to expand
the class of claimants who had standing.3 9 The Leaf Tobacco court, however,
emphasized that the nature of the zone of interests test will operate to
prohibit some plaintiffs from litigating substantive claims. 40
After finding the zone of interests test applicable to the Exporters'
claims, the Leaf Tobacco court determined whether the Exporters satisfied
the article III case or controversy requirement. 4' The Fourth Circuit in Leaf
Tobacco concluded that the Exporters satisfied the article III element of
standing inquiry by demonstrating an injury-in-fact. 42 The court reasoned
of stating a claim upon which the court can grant relief under Rule 12(b)(6). Marquis, supra,
at 285. A third commentator, Albert, argues that standing inquiry actually implicates the merits
of a claim and, therefore, courts should view standing as a substantive rather than threshhold
issue. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim
for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 426 (1974). But see Note, supra note 4, at 448-49 (proper applica-
tion of zone of interests test prevents abuse of judicial process and promotes separation of powers).
35. 749 F.2d at 1111, 1116; see Tax Analysts and Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d
130, 140 (D. C. Cir. 1977) (zone of interests test promotes separation of powers), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
36. 749 F.2d at 1111.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1115; see Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 154 (trend is to enlarge class of parties
who have standing to challenge agency action). The Supreme Court liberalized standing
requirements to avoid the defect of previous standing tests which tended to implicate in the
threshhold nature of standing inquiry a foray into the merits of claimants' substantive case.
Note, supra note 4, at 449-50.
40. See 749 F.2d at 1111. The Leaf Tobacco court cited United States Supreme Court
precedents to support the Leaf Tobacco court's observation that some parties will not have
standing under the zone of interests test. Id.; see Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974) (courts will not grant standing merely because no other acceptable
plaintiff exists to ensure adjudication of merits of claim); Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 489 (1982) (to grant
standing merely to assure that a court will address an issue would turn standing doctrine into
requirement that courts would observe only when claimants satisfied requirement).
41. 749 F.2d at 1112; see infra note 42 (discussing how Exporters satisfy article III
standing requirement).
42. See 749 F.2d at 1112 (Exporters satisfy article III standing requirement by alleging
1986]
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that the Exporters' assertion of economic harm resulting from increased
competition due to the growers' entry into the foreign market constituted
injury-in-fact.
4 3
Although the Leaf Tobacco court concluded that the Exporters satisfied
the article III element of standing, the court held that the Exporters failed
to satisfy the prudential considerations of the zone of interests test." The
Leaf Tobacco court stated that the zone of interests test required the
Exporters to demonstrate that the injury to the Exporters' ability to compete
was arguably within the zone of interests that Congress intended to protect
or regulate under the CCC Act and the 1949 Act. 45 To determine whether
the Exporters satisfied the test's requirements, the Leaf Tobacco court
examined the legislative intent of the statutes upon which the Exporters
based the Exporters' claims.4 6 Applying a limited analysis, which the Fourth
Circuit considered appropriate to the threshold question of standing, the
Fourth Circuit determined that the language of section 1427 of the 1949 Act
might protect the interests of commodity brokers such as the Exporters.
4 7
The Fourth Circuit, however, stated that section 1427 of the 1949 Act
protected the Exporters' interests only when the CCC's policies impaired the
brokers' abilities to maintain sufficient inventories.4 8 The Exporters did not
claim that the new 1982 USDA policy resulted in excessive depletion of the
Exporters' inventories.4 9 The Leaf Tobacco court, therefore, held that section
1427 was not relevant to a determination of whether the Exporters had
standing. 0




45. Id. at 1113-14.
46. Id. The review of legislative history, which the Fourth Circuit applied in Leaf Tobacco,
is the customary means for determining whether a statute arguably protects a claimants' interests
under the zone of interests test. See, e.g., Hartigan v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 746 F.2d
1300, 1309 (7th Cir. 1984) (analyzing legislative history to deny standing under zone of interests
test); Tax Analysts and Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130, 143-44 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (same),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Rodeway Inns of Am., Inc., v. Frank, 541 F.2d 759, 765
(8th Cir. 1976) (same), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977).
47. 749 F.2d at 1113.
48. Id; see infra notes 81-91 and accompanying text (discussing legislative histories of
CCC Act and 1949 Act).
49. 749 F.2d at 1113.
50. See id. The Leaf Tobacco court held that § 1427 of the 1949 Act was irrelevant to
the Exporters' standing for two reasons. Id.; see 7 U.S.C. § 1427 (1982) (providing support
price program governing CCC sales policies). First, the Leaf Tobacco court pointed out that
the Exporters failed to claim that the new CCC policy depleted the Exporters' inventories. 749
F.2d at 1113. Second, the court observed that § 1427 governs CCC sales, and that the Exporters
complained about Cooperative sales. Id.; see 7 U.S.C. § 1427 (1982) (section 1427 governs CCC
sales only). Contract, rather than § 1427 of the 1949 Act under which the Exporters sued,
governs the Cooperative's sales. 749 F.2d at 1113. See 7 U.S.C. § 1427 (1982) (support price
programs governing CCC sales policies).
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The Fourth Circuit next considered the Exporters' assertion that the
CCC Act's statement of purpose, section 714, arguably indicates congres-
sional intent to protect the Exporters' interests.5' The Leaf Tobacco court
acknowledged that statutory statements of purpose are instrumental in
evaluating legislative intent.5 2 The court also acknowledged the Exporters'
assertion that the CCC Act intended to encourage orderly distribution of
agricultural products.53 The Leaf Tobacco court, however, refused to find
standing based on the orderly distribution clause of section 714 of the CCC
Act because the new CCC policy did not interfere with orderly distribution
of tobacco.
5 4
Finally, the Leaf Tobacco court addressed the Exporters' assertion that
the enumeration of powers found in section 714(c) of Title 15 of the CCC
Act demonstrated congressional intent to protect commodity brokers. 5 The
Exporters asserted that the CCC Act's enumeration of powers required the
CCC to use the usual modes of trade and commerce in implementing federal
tobacco policy under the CCC Act. 56 The Fourth Circuit found no merit in
the Exporters' assertion that the Exporters, as the ordinary channel for
exporting tobacco, were entitled to protection from the Cooperative's com-
petition in the export market. 57 While recognizing the relevance of the
Exporters' section 714(c) claim to the prudential standing inquiry, the court
emphasized that the primary goal of the CCC Act was to protect farmers.
The Leaf Tobacco court reasoned that to adopt the Exporters' proposed
reading of the Act would result in protection of the Exporters, a group not
referred to in section 714(c), at the expense of the growers, the group that
Congress specifically intended to benefit. 59 Noting that courts should construe
statutes as harmonious wholes, 60 the Fourth Circuit declined to accept an
51. See 749 F.2d at 1114 (discussing CCC Act's statement of purpose); 15 U.S.C. § 714
(1982) (CCC Act's statement of purpose); see also infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text
(discussing legislative history of CCC Act).
52. 749 F.2d at 1114.
53. Id.; see infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of CCC
Act).
54. 749 F.2d at 1114.
55. Id. at 1114; see U.S.C. § 714(c) (1982) (enumeration of CCC powers includes duty to
use ordinary commercial channels when possible in implementing CCC policy).
56. 749 F.2d at 1114; see 15 U.S.C. § 714(c) (1982) (enumeration of CCC powers includes
duty to use usual channels of commerce when possible).
57. 749 F.2d at 1114-15.
58. Id.; see infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of CCC
Act).
59. 749 F.2d at 1114-15.
60. See id. at 1115 (citing Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S.
609, 631-32 (1973)). In Weinberger v. Hynson, the United States Supreme Court held courts
should read statutes in the most harmonious and comprehensive manner possible, to understand
the entire policy and purpose of the statute. Weinberger, 412 U.S. at 631-32. Allowing the
Exporters' 714c claim would violate the harmonious whole principle because the Exporters'
proposed interpretation of § 714(c) contradicts the statute's express primary purpose of
protecting the interests of farmers. See 749 F.2d at 1115 (Exporters advocate incorrect statutory
interpretation that violates harmonious whole principle of statutory construction).
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unsupported interpretation of the CCC Act that would contravene the express
purpose of the legislation.
6 1
The United States Supreme Court rarely has applied the zone of interests
test since creating the test in Data Processing v. Camp.6 2 In addition, the
Supreme Court has set forth few guidelines to govern the use of the zone of
interests test.63 Nevertheless, examination of the Data Processing case reveals
similarities between Data Processing and Leaf Tobacco, and indicates that
the Fourth Circuit was justified in applying the zone of interests test in Leaf
Tobacco.4 In Data Processing, the petitioners, who sold data processing
services, 65 challenged the Comptroller of Currency's new policy, which
jermitted national banks to furnish data processing services to bank cus-
tomers."6 Petitioners claimed that the Bank Services Corporation Act of
1962,67 which prohibits banks from performing any services other than
banking services, protected the petitioners. 8 The absence of a common-law
right against increased competition forced the petitioners to rely on the Bank
Services Act to protect the petitioners from undue competition. 9
61. 749 F.2d at 1115.
62. See 749 F.2d at 1110. The Leaf Tobacco court cited various cases in which the
Supreme Court applied the zone of interests test. Id.; see, e.g., Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp,
401 U.S. 617, 620 (1971) (claimants satisfied zone of interests test); Arnold Tours, Inc. v.
Camp, 400 U.S. 45, 46 (1970) (claimants satisfied zone of interests test); Barlow v. Collins, 397
U.S. 159, 164-67 (1970) (claimants satisfied zone of interests test). In addition to citing cases in
which the United States Supreme Court applied the zone of interests test, the Leaf Tobacco
court cited instances in which the Supreme Court has mentioned the test. See 749 F.2d at 1110
n.8 (citing Supreme Court cases which mention, but do not apply, the zone of interests test);
see Allen v. Wright, - U.S. - , 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3325 (1984) (citing zone of interests stand-
ing test); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (same); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,
100 n.6 (1979) (same); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 n.19 (1976)
(same); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 n.16 (1974) (same);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176 n.9 (1974) (same); United States v. SCRAP,
412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973) (same); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972) (same).
63. See Note, supra note 4, at 453-56 (discussing lack of Supreme Court guidance for
when courts should apply zone of interests test, and proper method of application).
64. See infra notes 65-72 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Courts' application
of zone of interests test).
65. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 151. Petitioners in Data Processing sold data processing
services commercially. Id.
66. See id. at 151. Petitioners in Data Processing challenged the Comptroller of Currency's
decisions to permit banks to provide data processing services to banks and bank customers as
part of providing general banking services. Id. The Comptroller of the Currency is the
administrator of all national banks. UNrrED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL at 110. (1984-85 ed.)
The Comptroller's responsibilities include carrying out national banking laws and promulgating
rules and regulations that govern the functioning of national banks. Id. at 110.
67. 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1982).
68. See 397 U.S. at 151. Petitioners in Data Processing asserted that § 1864 of the Bank
Services Corporation Act prohibits banks from performing nonbanking activity. Id.; see also
12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1982) (no bank services corporation may perform any activity other than
providing bank services for banks).
69. See Note, supra note 4, at 449 n.11. In 1982, the United States Supreme Court
adopted the English common-law rule that economic damage resulting from lawful competition
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The Data Processing Court held that petitioners had standing to challenge
the Comptroller's action. 70 Applying the newly created zone of interests test,
the Court held that petitioners satisfied article III standing requirements
because the alleged economic damage caused by increased competition con-
stituted injury-in-fact. 7' In addition, the Data Processing Court emphasized
that the interest to which petitioners claimed injury was arguably within the
zone of interests that Congress intended to protect when Congress prohibited
banks from engaging in nonbanking activity.
72
The petitioners in Data Processing alleged that the petitioners sustained
economic injuries as a result of increased competition.73 Similarly, in Leaf
Tobacco, the Exporters alleged economic injuries resulting from increased
competition. 74 In both Data Processing and Leaf Tobacco, new competition
arose because of agency action.75 The Exporters asserted that the CCC's
action violated statutory provisions, and caused injury to an interest that fell
within the zone of interests Congress intended to protect in the CCC Act
and the 1949 Act. 76 As in Data Processing, the Exporters could not invoke
a common law right against injury due to increased competition, since no
such right existed in the American legal system. 77 Rather, the Exporters
invoked an alleged right created by statute. 78 Indeed, the primary difference
between Data Processing and Leaf Tobacco is that application of the zone
of interests test provided standing to the Association of Data Processers,
while denying standing to the Exporters. 79 The Fourth Circuit's analysis of
the relevant legislative history in Leaf Tobacco, however, suggests that
different results obtained from application of the zone of interests test do
not necessarily indicate inconsistency. 0
was not a legally protected interest. Id. at 449 n.11; see Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U.S.
166, 174 (1881) (no common-law right against lawful competition). The United States Supreme
Court extended the 1882 rule to cover administrative actions in 1940. Note, supra note 4, at
449 n.11; see Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940) (no common-law right
against lawful competition resulting from administrative action).
70. 397 U.S. at 158.
71. See id. at 152 (economic harm due to increased competition constitutes injury-in-fact).
72. Id. at 156.
73. Id. at 152.
74. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (discussing Exporters' claim that new
USDA foreign export policy created economic injury through increased competition).
75. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing Data Processing decision of
Comptroller of Currency to permit banks to engage in non-banking activities); supra note 23
and accompanying text (discussing USDA's decision to allow Cooperative to sell tobacco to
foreign buyers, challenged in Leaf Tobacco).
76. 749 F.2d at 1110.
77. See supra note 69 (discussing Supreme Court's adoption of English common-law rule
that damages caused by lawful competition are not legally protected interest).
78. 749 F.2d at 1110.
79. Compare Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 158 (under zone of interests test claimants
have standing to sue in competitor suit) with Leaf Tobacco, 749 F.2d at 1108 (claimants lack
standing to sue in competitor suit for failure to satisfy zone of interests test).
80. 749 F.2d at 1115. The Leaf Tobacco court did not consider the Leaf Tobacco result
inconsistent with Data Processing. Id. The Leaf Tobacco court held that the legislative histories
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Analysis of the legislative intent behind both the CCC Act and the 1949
Act supports the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the Exporters' economic
interest in avoiding increased competition is not arguably within the zone
of interests that Congress intended to protect under either the CCC Act or
the 1949 Act." Congress intended the CCC Act to stabilize farm income and
prices8 2 and to assure that the income of producers of nonessential products,
such as tobacco, would be comparable to the income of producers of basic
items.83 Previously existing legislation protected the income of basic product
producers through similar price support systems.14 In addition, Congress
established the CCC Act to maintain the health of America's agricultural
economy. 5 Consequently, the CCC Act promotes the interests of American
farmers by providing economic stability of income levels. Commodity bro-
kers, such as the Exporters, are not express or implied beneficiaries of the
CCC program. Therefore, to allow the Exporters to challenge CCC policy
would extend the privileges of the CCC benefits to parties whom Congress
did not intend to protect.
Similarly, Congress enacted the 1949 Act to establish farm income and
prices.8 6 Congress intended to extend the World War II practice of providing
price supports as production incentives into the peacetime economy.87 The
report of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry observed that
agency officials responsible for acquiring commodities for the government
under the 1949 Act should also control the disposal of the commodities.88
Congress, therefore, intended that the CCC, as the manager of the program
through which the USDA acquired tobacco, should have power and discretion
to provide for the disposition of the tobacco crop. Similarly, Congress
of the CCC Act and 1949 Act clearly indicate that the Exporters interests were not within zone
of congressionally protected interests. 749 F.2d at 1115. In Data Processing, legislative history
indicated that petitioner's interests were arguably within the zone of congressionally protected
interests in the Bank Services Corporation Act. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 151; see 12 U.S.C.
§ 1864 (1982) (prohibiting banks from engaging in nonbanking activity).
81. See infra notes 81-91 and accompanying text (analyzing legislative histories of CCC
Act and 1949 Act).
82. See S. REP. No. 1022, 80th Cong. 2d Sess., 1, 3 (1948) (CCC Act's purpose is to
stabilize farm economy and support farm income), reprinted in 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2138, 2141.
83. See S. REP. No. 1022, 80th Cong. 2d Sess., 1, 3 (1948) (Act's purpose is to assure
nonessential product income is comparable to essential product income), reprinted in 1948 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2138, 2141 (1948).
84. Id.
85. See id. at 2151 (CCC Act's purpose is to maintain healthy farm economy).
86. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of 1949
Act).
87. See S. REP. No. 1091, 81st cong. 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1949) reprinted in 1949 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2407, 2408 (1949 Act's intent is to extend wartime price supports as
production incentives in peacetime economy).
88. See S. REP. No. 1022, 80th Cong. 2d Sess. at 3 (1948), (persons charged with programs
through which agencies acquire commodities have discretion as to disposition of commodities),
reprinted in 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws, at 2414.
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enacted the 1949 Act primarily for the benefit of agricultural producers.Y9
Congress explained that agencies like the CCC should have the power to
provide for disposal of commodities at the agency's discretion. 9° Conse-
quently, the Exporters' interests as commodity brokers are not arguably
within the zone of interests that Congress intended to protect under the 1949
Act. The legislative history and statutory language of the CCC Act and the
1949 Act, therefore, indicate that Congress did not intend to protect the
Exporters from competition in the foreign tobacco market. 9' In contrast, the
legislative history and statutory language of the Act upon which the petition-
ers in Data Processing relied did protect the petitioners' interests.
92
In Leaf Tobacco, the Fourth Circuit properly applied the zone of interests
test to deny standing to the Exporters. 93 The Fourth Circuit recognized that
the Supreme Court created the zone of interests test as part of a liberalization
of standing requirements. 94 Nevertheless, the Leaf Tobacco decision serves
notice to Fourth Circuit attorneys that the relaxation of standing require-
ments is not unlimited. 95 Even the flexible standard that complainant arguably
must be within the zone of statutorily protected interests means that some
claimants will not satisfy the zone of interests test. 96 Consequently, Fourth
Circuit claimants seeking to challenge agency action will have standing to
adjudicate the merits of the claim only upon a clear and unambiguous
demonstration that the language and legislative history of the statute upon





91. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text (discussing how legislative history of
1949 Act and CCC Act do not protect Exporters' interests in Leaf Tobacco).
92. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history and analysis
in Data Processing).
93. See supra notes 32-37, 64-91 and accompanying text (discussing support for Leaf
Tobacco court's denial of standing for failure to satisfy zone of interests test).
94. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing trend to enlarge class of parties
with standing).
95. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing that proper application of
standing tests must result in preclusion of some parties from litigation of claims).
96. See id.
97. See supra notes 3-5, 64-91 and accompanying text (discussing bases supporting Fourth
Circuit's dismissal of Exporters' claims in Leaf Tobacco for lack of standing).
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